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Abstract
In theoretical discussions about the relation between education and training, the question of complementarity or
substitutability between these two different forms of human capital is raised. If initial education and industrial training
are substitutes, overeducated workers will participate less in additional training than workers who are adequately edu-
cated. It could explain the persistence of overeducation and implies that the social wastage of overeducation will be
less. On the other hand, if initial education and industrial training are complements, existing differences in human
capital will only increase by industrial training, implying the risk for some workers of ‘missing the boat’. Supplementary
to Groot we not only look at the impact of over- and undereducation (level) but also at non-matching ﬁelds of studies
and the ‘narrowness’ of types of education. A sample of labour market entrants was used, so we did not have to cope
with the disturbing inﬂuence of other forms of human capital: life and labour market experience. The paper gives
evidence in support of both substitutability and complementarity between initial education and ﬁrm training. Ó 2000
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
People spend a quarter of their lives at school, but
learning does not stop when they leave. For both organis-
ations and individuals, ‘permanent education’ is gradu-
ally becoming the normal state of affairs. In some cases
work itself offers plenty of opportunities to learn, and in
other cases training is given outside the immediate work-
ing environment. This training can have various func-
tions, ranging from complete retraining (e.g. as a result
of occupational mobility), through further training
because skills have become obsolete, to training to help
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an employee master a new function. The last of these is
particularly important for newcomers to the labour mar-
ket. An analysis of the training which accompanies the
entry of school-leavers to the labour market will high-
light the match between the skills which are demanded
in the labour market and the skills which are acquired
during initial education. This will have implications for
the question of what skills should be, or should not be,
incorporated in initial education.
This article focuses ﬁrst of all on the determinants of
training participation of labour market entrants: what
determines the probability that a school-leaver will
receive training after leaving initial education? Are initial
differences in human capital investments reduced or
actually increased by further training? And is the main
function of training to compensate for deﬁciencies in
initial education (substitution), or does it in fact build on
the skills acquired in the education system
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This article examines the determinants of training for
Dutch school-leavers from Short Senior Secondary
Vocational Education (KMBO), Senior Secondary
Vocational Education (MBO) and Higher Vocational
Education (HBO), corresponding to three levels of edu-
cational attainment.1 We look at one particular form of
training, e.g. ﬁrm training, including both external
courses and in-company training, but excluding informal
on-the-job training and also excluding apprenticeship
training.
2. Theoretical framework
When analysing the determinants of training, it is
important to distinguish between two important functions
of training. First, training can be considered as an invest-
ment in human capital, sometimes building on the skills
which have already been acquired during initial edu-
cation. Second, training can have a function in bridging
any gaps which may exist between the skills which are
demanded and those which employees possess. In theor-
etical terms, these functions correspond to two theoreti-
cal approaches, which overlap to some extent: the human
capital theory and the matching theory. The theories can
be said to overlap because training to supplement skills
may also have the character of an investment. Neverthe-
less, the two theories model two different ways of look-
ing at training.
The central principle of the human capital theory is
that the skills which are acquired in training represent
human capital, which is valued by employers because it
leads to higher productivity. This higher productivity
will be manifest in higher wages (Becker, 1975). This
also shows that education and training are investments.
Relevant short-term expenditure can generate a ‘cash
ﬂow’ in the long term. As with other investment plans,
it is possible to carry out cost–beneﬁt analyses, for
example the internal rate of return (Psacharopoulos,
1987).
Employers will train their workers if the expected rate
of return from the investment in training is higher than
the alternative rate of return for investments with a simi-
lar risk (for example, the market interest). Of course, the
expected rate of return on training is dependent on the
training costs, but also on the investment horizon, the
increase in productivity and the increase in wage costs.
Employees can also decide to invest in training, and
according to the human capital theory they will do so if
the expected rate of return on the investment is higher
than the alternative rate of return with an equal risk. The
balance of the beneﬁts (in higher wages) and training
1 See Appendix A for a description of the Dutch edu-
cational system.
costs over the whole investment period produces an
internal rate of return which is compared with an alterna-
tive rate of return.
One signiﬁcant factor in determining the costs of train-
ing, for both individuals and employers, is the time
needed to acquire new skills. Therefore the costs of train-
ing will be lower for individuals with a greater learning
ability, as indicated by the educational level they have
attained. Reversely, when there are ﬁxed training costs
higher educated people can learn more and therefore can
raise more beneﬁts. The ratio between the costs and
beneﬁts of training is thus more favourable for those with
higher education than for those with lower-level edu-
cation, so that a higher educational level will increase
the probability of ﬁrm training. Formal education and
ﬁrm training can then be considered as complements.
Another important factor in determining the costs of
training is the organisation size. Extensive empirical
research has shown that large organisations train their
personnel much more intensively than small organis-
ations (CBS, 1995; Fracis, Hertz & Horrigan, 1995;
Green, 1993). This may be partly due to economies of
scale when purchasing, or providing training. In the case
of in-company training, the ﬁxed costs of training (for
example the management and the premises for a training
department) can be spread over a large number of
employees, and in the case of out-company training it
will be possible to obtain a discount for quantity. In
addition, the ‘pooling’ of the training risks in larger
organisations will produce a lower risk on the total
investment.2 Therefore, larger organisations will have a
higher probability of employees participating in ﬁrm
training.
The investment horizon is particularly important in
determining the expected returns on the investment. For
a given level of training costs, and given training beneﬁts
per period (change in productivity minus change in
wages), the shorter the (expected) investment horizon is,
the lower the net present value and internal rate of return
on the investment will be. An employer will therefore
be less likely to train part-time employees, since the
training will be utilised and made to pay over fewer
future working hours, and will also be less likely to train
employees with a temporary contract, because of the
higher risk that such employees will leave. Not the actual
investment horizon, but rather the subjectively expected
investment horizon determines the training investments.
Employers who expect women to withdraw from the lab-
our market will calculate a lower expected internal rate
of return for women (see also Groot, Schippers & Sieg-
ers, 1988). This expectation is based on the average lab-
2 Ritzen (1991) makes a similar point, by suggesting that the
inability of individuals to ‘pool’ their training risk leads to
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our market behaviour of women (Green, 1993). This can
lead an employer to be less ready to invest in training
for women, so their probability of getting trained will
be reduced.
In the analysis above, training has been considered
mainly as a form of investment in human capital. But
training can also, and simultaneously, serve the function
of bridging differences between an individual’s skills and
the skills which are required. This aspect of training is
most explicitly discussed in the matching theory and
clearly refers to substitution between initial education
and ﬁrm training. According to this theory, a mismatch
between the required skills and the skills a worker actu-
ally possesses has important consequences for pro-
ductivity, wages, the probability of an employee leaving,
and so forth. Variations in the quality of the match (by
level and ﬁeld of study) will therefore lead to differences
in the need for additional training (Barron, Black &
Loewenstein, 1989). If the educational level which is
required for a particular job is lower than the educational
level of the person holding that job, this is known as
overeducation, and if the educational level required for
the job is higher than the educational level of the worker
concerned this is termed undereducation. According to
matching theory, undereducation will lead to a greater
need for further training, while overeducation means that
there is less need for training.
In addition to the effect of the educational level of a
worker, the match between the employee’s ﬁeld of edu-
cation and the ﬁeld of education which is required for
the job is also relevant. According to matching theory,
if the ﬁeld of the employee’s education corresponds to
the ﬁeld which is required, the need for further training
in the form of ﬁrm training will be less, and vice versa.
Types of education also vary in the scope of the occu-
pational ﬁeld for which they prepare (De Grip & Heijke,
1989). Some types of education prepare students for a
narrow occupational domain (for example, Senior Sec-
ondary Vocational Education for pharmacy assistants),
while others prepare for a broad occupational ﬁeld (for
example, Senior Secondary Vocational Education in
mechanical engineering). If school-leavers from a ‘nar-
row’ type of education ﬁnd work in their own ﬁeld, the
need for supplementary training will presumably be less
than for people with a ‘broad’ education working in their
own ﬁeld. However, if school-leavers from a ‘narrow’
type of education ﬁnd employment outside the ﬁeld in
which they studied, the need for training (i.e. retraining)
will be even higher.
3. Data
The data which have been used to answer the research
questions come from the STOA (Schoolverlaters tussen
onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt) survey which records the
ﬂows of school-leavers and their destinations in the lab-
our market. The STOA survey gives a representative
nation-wide picture of young people leaving General
Secondary Education, Junior Secondary Vocational Edu-
cation, Short Senior Secondary Vocational Education,
Senior Secondary Vocational Education, or Higher
Vocational Education. The survey is held approximately
11
2 years after leaving school.3
The data used for this analysis come from the 1996
survey which records the 1994/95 school-leavers cohort.
The present analysis is based on a sub-sample consisting
of school-leavers who completed Short Senior Secondary
Vocational Education (KMBO), Senior Secondary
Vocational Education (MBO) or Higher Vocational Edu-
cation (HBO). They had paid work in the Netherlands
for at least 12 hours per week at the time of the survey,
were not self-employed and were also not participating
in full-time education or apprenticeship. Those who did
not satisfy these conditions or who had missing values
on the variables which were used for the analysis were
excluded. This resulted in a sub-sample of 11,901 cases
who had studied in 129 different ﬁelds of study.
The indicator of participation in ﬁrm training is the
question whether the school-leavers had participated in
a course or in-company training since the time of the
survey (i.e. about 11
2 years). It excludes hobby courses,
informal on-the-job training and apprenticeship training.
The following variables have been selected as determi-
nants of the probability of training: gender, ethnic back-
ground, educational level, width of initial education, size
of the organisation, branch,4 part-time work,5 overeduc-
ation or undereducation,6 the length of service (in
months), and the ﬁeld of study required for the job.
7
3 STOA is a combination of two former surveys — RUBS
and HBO-Monitor. For a more detailed description of the
STOA survey, see ROA (1997a,b).
4 Classiﬁed using standard industrial classiﬁcation (SBI)
employed by Statistics Netherlands.
5 Deﬁned as contractual employment for 32 hours or less
per week.
6 The school-leavers were asked what educational level was
required for their job. This required educational level is com-
pared with the level of education they have completed. The
various types of education are divided into the following levels:
(1) Primary Education; (2) Junior Secondary Vocational
Education/Junior General Secondary Education; (3) Short
Senior Secondary Vocational Education; (4) Senior Secondary
Vocational Education/Senior General Secondary Education/Pre-
University Education; (5) Higher Vocational Education or
higher. If the required educational level is below the employee’s
actual educational level, this is called overeducation and if the
required educational level is higher than employee’s actual edu-
cational level this is called undereducation.
7 This match is determined directly, by asking the respon-
dents whether the required type of education for their job is
their own ﬁeld, a related ﬁeld, another ﬁeld, or no particular
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The width of the respondent’s initial education has
been operationalised as follows (see also Appendix B).
For each of the 129 different ﬁelds of study, a Gini–
Hirschman coefﬁcient (Sheldon, 1985) was calculated
for the dispersion of people with that type of education
across the occupational groups. This coefﬁcient is a con-
tinuous variable ranging from 0 (if every school-leaver
ﬁnds employment in the same occupational group) to 1
(if school-leavers are evenly dispersed over all occu-
pational groups). The occupational dispersion of workers
with a certain type of education represents the width of
that type of education.
4. Results
What are the most important determinants of training?
To answer this question, a logistic regression equation
has been estimated, for the probability of participation
in ﬁrm training. The results are shown in Table 1. For
the averages and standard deviations of all the variables
used, see Appendix C.
Some of the variables which are included in the esti-
mation model have already been discussed in the theor-
etical section, like gender, educational level, the width
of initial education and the size of the organisation. The
model also incorporates a number of other personal, edu-
cational and organisational characteristics (such as ethnic
background and branch) which have not been explicitly
considered in the theoretical framework.
Table 1 contains estimation results of the basic model,
which encompasses almost 12,000 cases. To detect any
interaction effects between the ﬁeld of study which is
required for the job and the type of education which has
been followed, additionally four separate equations have
been estimated (see also Table 1). Moreover, to explore
interaction effects8 of the level of educational attainment
and the width variable, Table 2 was included (in combi-
nation with Appendix D).
The hypothesis that a higher educational level
increases the probability of training, is clearly conﬁrmed
by our model. School-leavers of the reference category
HBO have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of training
participation than school-leavers of MBO, who in turn
have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of training partici-
pation than school-leavers at the lowest KMBO-level
(respectively t=3.3 and t=2.8). The result is also robust
for the separate equations in Table 1. This ﬁnding is in
line with other empirical studies, which also point to a
positive relationship between the educational level of
8 The addition of an interaction parameter HBO´width in
the basic model is signiﬁcant at a 99% conﬁdence level
(coefﬁcient is 21.24; standard error is 0.48). The complete
results are available on request.
employees and participation in training (see for example
OECD, 1991; Allaart, Kunnen, Praat, van Stiphout &
Vosse, 1991).
The positive relation between organisation size and
participation in ﬁrm training is also clearly conﬁrmed in
this analysis. In very large ﬁrms (500 employees or
more) or large ﬁrms (50–499 employees), school-leavers
participate in ﬁrm training signiﬁcantly more often than
in organisations with 10–50 employees (the reference
group), while in very small organisations (1–10
employees) there is a signiﬁcantly lower probability of
participation in ﬁrm training.
The impact of the beneﬁt-side of the investment in
ﬁrm training is also conﬁrmed by our data of school-
leavers. Derived from the human capital theory we for-
mulated the hypothesis that employees working under
part-time contracts are less likely to participate in ﬁrm
training, since the ‘life-time’ beneﬁts of the new qualiﬁ-
cations will be less for such employees. The hypothesis
that employees with a permanent contract are more likely
to participate in ﬁrm training was also conﬁrmed by the
analysis. The effect is quite strong; with an average
chance of training since leaving school of 0.37, the pre-
dicted chance of school-leavers with a permanent con-
tract is 0.52. Contrary to our expectations the probability
of training participation of women is the same as for
men.
In outlining the theoretical framework, a number of
hypotheses relating to the function of training in bridging
differences between an individual’s skills and the skills
which are required were formulated. Someone who has
completed a course at a higher educational level than is
required for the job (overeducation) will be less likely
to participate in ﬁrm training, while undereducation will
result in a higher probability. The results in Table 1 show
that overeducation indeed has the expected effect on the
participation rate of ﬁrm training. Overeducation results
in a signiﬁcantly lower probability of this kind of train-
ing. In models (2), (3), (4) and (5), the effect of overed-
ucation is also negative, but in (2) and (4) it is not sig-
niﬁcant. The expected positive effect of undereducation
on training participation is not conﬁrmed in the analysis.
The standard error of this parameter is high, because
only 2% of school-leavers found a job above their edu-
cational attainment.
The lower probability of ﬁrm training for overedu-
cated school-leavers is not necessarily due to a surplus
of skills. There are two other possible reasons: a non-
random quit rate and/or a non-random learning ability.
Hersch (1991) gives evidence in support of the intuitive
notion that overeducated workers are less satisﬁed with
their jobs and are more likely to quit. The lower training
probability of overeducated school-leavers — compared
with school-leavers with the same educational attainment
but with a job at a matching level — could therefore be
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Table 2
Estimation results of the probability of participation in industrial training (logit) in the baseline model, and separately for school-
leavers working in a job for which training in their own ﬁeld, a related ﬁeld, another ﬁeld, or no particular ﬁeld, is requireda
Total Own ﬁeld Related ﬁeld Another ﬁeld No particular ﬁeld
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
MBO (6a) (7a) (8a) (9a) (10a)
Width of initial education 1.20* 0.52 20.08 1.07 1.82** 0.74 3.51 3.43 1.90 1.19
Overeducation 20.27** 0.10 20.10 0.27 20.24 0.15 20.07 0.39 20.41* 0.18
Matching level ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Undereducation 0.32 0.29 20.33 0.89 20.05 0.40 2.15 1.16 1.21 0.75
Own ﬁeld of study ref ref . . . . . . . .
Related ﬁeld of study 0.02 0.10 . . . . . . . .
Another ﬁeld of study 0.28 0.20 . . . . . . . .
No ﬁeld of study 20.23 0.13 . . . . . . . .
HBO (6b) (7b) (8b) (9b) (10b)
Width of initial education 20.36** 0.12 20.73** 0.25 20.28 0.18 0.69 0.70 20.07 0.39
Overeducation 20.23** 0.06 20.04 0.20 20.16* 0.08 20.17 0.24 20.33* 0.13
Matching level ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Undereducation 0.46 0.29 22.58* 1.06 0.27 0.41 1.26 0.87 0.10 1.18
Own ﬁeld of study ref ref . . . . . . . .
Related ﬁeld of study 0.21** 0.07 . . . . . . . .
Another ﬁeld of study 0.44** 0.13 . . . . . . . .
No ﬁeld of study 0.27** 0.09 . . . . . . . .
a Asterisks indicate level of signiﬁcance: *p,5%; **p,1%. Not included in the model.
leads to a shorter investment horizon, so it will be less
attractive to invest in ﬁrm training. Therefore, we also
estimated a model in which we controlled for the quit
intention of school-leavers.9 The regression coefﬁcient
of the variable quit intention is only 20.07 — with a
standard error of 0.05 — so it is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant. Moreover, adding this extra variable has no impact
on the regression coefﬁcients of over- or undereducation.
So, overeducated school-leavers do not have a lower
chance of being trained because they are bound to leave
the company earlier.
Secondly, suppose that there is an unobserved variable
learning ability which both inﬂuences the probability of
ﬁrm training and the probability of being overeducated.
School-leavers who have to step aside to a job under
their educational attainment might have less learning
ability than school-leavers with the same educational
attainment who ﬁnd a job at a matching level. This
would result in the human capital argument that school-
leavers with less learning ability will need more time to
acquire new skills, so the training costs will be higher
and the probability of training will be lower. In that case
9 They were asked if they had been searching for another
job in the previous 4 weeks.
the explanation for a negative effect of overeducation on
the likelihood of ﬁrm training is not the lesser need for
training because of the surplus of skills, but the lesser
ability of overeducated school-leavers. To test the val-
idity of this alternative explanation a logit model of
being overeducated was estimated. The residual e1 will
capture the inﬂuence of unobserved variables on the
chance of being overeducated, while residual e2 captures
the inﬂuence of unobserved variables on the chance of
being trained. A correlation between e1 and e2 is an indi-
cation of the existence of an unobserved variable that
both inﬂuences the probability of overeducation and the
probability of ﬁrm training. However, the result of this
analysis shows that the correlation between e1 and e2 is
almost zero (0.0032). The explanation that overeducated
school-leavers have a lower likelihood of ﬁrm training
because of their surplus of skills is therefore not falsiﬁed
by the data.
The hypothesis that school-leavers who are working
within the ﬁeld in which they studied would have less
need for further training than school-leavers who ﬁnd
work in a ﬁeld other than that in which they studied, was
also conﬁrmed (Table 1). Both school-leavers who have
found a job in which a related ﬁeld of study was required
and school-leavers who have found a job in which
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higher likelihood of training participation. Furthermore,
the difference between the latter two coefﬁcients —
related and another ﬁeld — is also signiﬁcant (t=2.0).
Thus, the more deviant the ﬁeld of study the more often
training is required. This is in line with the assumption
that school-leavers who work within the ﬁeld in which
they have studied would have less need for additional
training compared with people who are working outside
the ﬁeld in which they studied.
When formal education and additional training can be
considered as substitutes, an interaction effect for the
width of that formal education is expected. School-leav-
ers from a ‘narrow’ type of education who ﬁnd work
in their own ﬁeld will need less supplementary training.
However, if school-leavers from a ‘narrow’ type of edu-
cation ﬁnd employment outside the ﬁeld in which they
studied, the need for training (i.e. retraining) will be even
higher. This substitution hypothesis is not conﬁrmed by
the estimation results of Table 1. On the contrary,
school-leavers who ﬁnd a job in their own ﬁeld of study
have a signiﬁcantly lower chance of training partici-
pation the broader the formal education is. Narrow types
of education lead to more training, especially for school-
leavers who ﬁnd a job in their own ﬁeld. This is a con-
ﬁrmation of the complementarity hypothesis, e.g. the
more one has the more one gets.
Breaking the ﬁve models down by level of edu-
cation — MBO and HBO (see Table 2 and Appendix
D) — shows different effects of the width of education.
The above ﬁnding, that narrow types of education lead
to more training, especially for school-leavers who ﬁnd
a job in their own ﬁeld, is only valid for HBO. For MBO,
broader types of education lead to more training,
especially for school-leavers who ﬁnd a job in a related
ﬁeld of study. This latter result is puzzling because it
conﬁrms neither the complementarity hypothesis nor the
substitution hypothesis.
5. Summary and conclusions
Several hypotheses were formulated on the basis of
the human capital theory and the matching theory. The
most important ﬁndings can be summarised as follows.
1. As expected, a higher educational level results in a
higher probability of participation in ﬁrm training.
Also, the probability of participation in ﬁrm training
being higher in large organisations is conﬁrmed.
2. Part-timers as well as school-leavers with a temporary
contract are signiﬁcantly less likely to participate in
ﬁrm training than full-timers and school-leavers with
a permanent contract, respectively. Male school-leav-
ers did not have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of
participation in ﬁrm training.
3. As expected, overeducation results in a lower prob-
ability of participation in ﬁrm training. Undereduc-
ation did not, however, lead to a higher partici-
pation rate.
4. School-leavers working outside the ﬁeld in which
they studied are more likely to participate in ﬁrm
training than school-leavers working within the ﬁeld
in which they were initially educated.
5. School-leavers from a ‘narrow’ type of education (i.e.
a type of education focused on one or only a few
occupational groups) who work in their own ﬁeld are
more likely to participate in ﬁrm training than school-
leavers from broader types of education who are
working in their own ﬁelds. However, this is only
valid for school-leavers of HBO.
As regards the determinants of ﬁrm training of labour
market entrants, we have to conclude that these conﬁrm
the expectations related to the rate of return of ﬁrm train-
ing. For example, the effects of educational level, the
size of the organisation, part-time work and temporary
work all conﬁrm the hypotheses of the human capital
theory.
According to the matching theory, initial education
and ﬁrm training can be seen as substitutes. The results
of this study indicate that training not only has a function
of investment in human capital, but also serves a func-
tion in bridging discrepancies between the skills pos-
sessed by the school-leavers and the skills demanded on
the labour market. In the ﬁrst place, it appears that
school-leavers who are working in jobs which are below
their educational level are trained less. This is an
important ﬁnding, because as many as one in three of
all working school-leavers are over-educated for the jobs
they have. Secondly, school-leavers who work in the
ﬁeld in which they were educated are less likely to be
trained than school-leavers who ﬁnd work in a related
or another ﬁeld of study. The need for additional training
is stronger for school-leavers who have to step aside to
a completely different ﬁeld of study than for school-leav-
ers who switch to a related ﬁeld of study than that in
which they were educated. These ﬁndings indicate that
ﬁrm training has a clear function to bridge skills gaps
between the skills attained and the skills required.
The effect of the width of the type of education on
training participation is ambiguous. At HBO-level, a nar-
rower type of education leads to more training, which is
a conﬁrmation of the idea that formal education and
training are complementary. However, at MBO-level
there is no evidence of complementarity or substitution.
The question of whether training can compensate for
any deﬁciencies in formal education (substitution) or
only increases already existing differences in human
capital (complementarity) has not been solved in this
article. One could conclude, however, that the substi-
tution character of training is merely detected in the
characteristics of the job (level and type of the job) while214 M.S.M. van Smoorenburg, R.K.W. van der Velden / Economics of Education Review 19 (2000) 207–217
evidence for the complementarity character of training is
merely found in the characteristics of the formal edu-
cation (level and width).
Appendix A
A.1. Dutch educational system
Like most other European countries, a distinction is
made in the Netherlands between general and vocational
Appendix B
One measure of the possibilities of switching occu-
pations offered by a type of education is the Gini–
Hirschman coefﬁcient of the occupational dispersion of
workers with that education, GHi








in which pio is the proportion of workers with education
i who work in occupation o, and No is the number of
occupations.
This factor can range between 0 and 1. If the GH
occ
coefﬁcient is 1, workers with that education are equally
spread over all occupations, and if GHocc is 0, workers
with that education are found in only one occupation.
education. As shown in the diagram of the Dutch edu-
cational system, vocational education (‘Beroeps
Onderwijs’) takes place at three educational levels: the
level of junior secondary vocational education (VBO),
the level of senior secondary vocational education
(MBO) and the level of higher education (vocational col-
leges (HBO) and university (WO).
Thus, the higher the value of the GHocc coefﬁcient, the
greater the possibilities available to workers with that
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Table 3
Averages and standard deviations for all variablesa
Unweighted plus listwise deletion of missing Weighted plus pairwise deletion of missing
values (for estimates) values (for description)
Average SD Average SD
Female 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.50
Ethnic minority 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14
KMBO 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.33
MBO 0.29 0.46 0.48 0.50
HBO (ref.) 0.68 0.47 0.40 0.49
Width of initial education 0.71 0.20 0.73 0.17
1–9 employees 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36
10–49 employees (ref.) 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48
50–499 employees 0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44
500 or more employees 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41
Agriculture and ﬁsheries 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15
Industry and mining (ref.) 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37
Construction 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23
Commerce, hotel and catering 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41
Transport and communication 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22
Commercial services 0.27 0.45 0.21 0.41
Other services 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35
Health care 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35
Overeducation 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46
Matching level (ref.) 0.72 0.45 0.67 0.47
Undereducation 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.19
Own ﬁeld (ref.) 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Related ﬁeld 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.50
Another ﬁeld 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22
No particular ﬁeld 0.19 0.40 0.24 0.42
Permanent contract 0.76 0.43 0.72 0.45
Part-time job 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41
Length of service 9.8 5.8 9.9 5.9
Firm training 0.43 0.50 0.37 0.48
a KMBO, Short Senior Secondary Vocational Education; MBO, Senior Secondary Vocational Education; HBO, Higher
Vocational Education.
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Table 4
MBO: estimation results of the probability of participation in ﬁrm training in the basic model, and separately for school-leavers
working in a job for which training in their own ﬁeld, another ﬁeld, and no particular ﬁeld is required. Values are regression
coefﬁcients with standard errors (SE)a
Total Own ﬁeld Related ﬁeld Another ﬁeld No particular ﬁeld
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
MBO (6a) (7a) (8a) (9a) (10a)
Female 20.09 0.09 20.20 0.22 20.17 0.12 20.02 0.43 0.07 0.18
Ethnic minority 20.24 0.25 0.33 0.44 20.38 0.38 21.08 1.06 20.88 0.71
1–9 employees 20.20 0.11 20.29 0.22 20.23 0.16 0.40 0.52 20.24 0.23
10–49 employees ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
50–499 employees 20.07 0.10 0.26 0.24 20.09 0.14 0.45 0.55 20.38 0.23
500 or more employees 0.10 0.11 20.15 0.29 0.20 0.15 20.02 0.57 0.04 0.23
Agriculture and ﬁsheries 0.07 0.21 20.03 0.48 0.16 0.30 20.59 1.30 0.25 0.44
Industry and mining ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Construction 0.57** 0.19 0.40 0.37 0.55* 0.27 20.40 1.02 1.17* 0.49
Commerce, hotel and catering 0.42** 0.13 0.90** 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.58 0.55 0.29
Transport and communication 0.61** 0.18 0.89 0.49 0.60** 0.24 1.07 0.80 0.54 0.41
Commercial services 0.80** 0.15 0.50 0.35 0.76** 0.20 0.77 0.70 1.19** 0.34
Other services 0.58** 0.17 0.22 0.40 0.52* 0.24 0.47 0.74 1.27** 0.37
Health care 20.53** 0.16 20.86* 0.36 20.40 0.22 21.37 1.00 0.07 0.48
Permanent contract 0.37** 0.10 0.67** 0.27 0.28* 0.13 0.68 0.49 0.31 0.19
Part-time job 20.09 0.10 0.45 0.26 20.24 0.15 20.41 0.50 0.04 0.20
Length of service 0.00 0.01 20.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 20.02 0.01
Constant 22.03** 0.43 21.30 0.91 22.43** 0.62 24.14 2.81 22.76** 1.00
Other derminants (see Table 2) y y y y y y y y y y
No. of cases 3477 725 1778 146 828
22 log likelihood 4113 819 2140 173 922
a Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance: *p,5%; **p,1%.
Table 5
HBO: estimation results of the probability of participation in ﬁrm training in the basic model, and separately for school-leavers
working in a job for which training in their own ﬁeld, another ﬁeld, and no particular ﬁeld, respectively, is required. Values are
regression coefﬁcients with standard errors (SE)a
Total Own ﬁeld Related ﬁeld Another ﬁeld No particular ﬁeld
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
HBO (6b) (7b) (8b) (9b) (10b)
Female 0.00 0.05 20.02 0.13 0.05 0.07 20.08 0.23 20.13 0.13
Ethnic minority 20.15 0.21 20.19 0.51 20.10 0.25 21.08 1.25 20.14 0.59
1–9 employees 20.11 0.10 0.30 0.18 20.42** 0.14 0.57 0.45 20.23 0.24
10-49 employees ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
50-499 employees 0.38** 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.34** 0.08 0.60* 0.30 0.63** 0.16
500 or more employees 0.65** 0.06 0.67** 0.16 0.60** 0.08 0.28 0.31 0.87** 0.16
Agriculture and ﬁsheries 20.28 0.39 24.58 7.67 20.34 0.55 24.89 9.55 0.70 0.64
Industry and mining ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Construction 0.18 0.14 0.41 0.29 0.20 0.19 21.37 0.73 0.23 0.44
Commerce, hotel and catering 20.00 0.10 0.26 0.29 20.01 0.12 20.02 0.41 0.07 0.23
Transport and communication 0.33** 0.13 0.42 0.39 0.44** 0.17 20.22 0.53 0.44 0.27
Commercial services 0.74** 0.07 0.59** 0.19 0.70** 0.09 0.65 0.34 1.11** 0.19
Other services 0.07 0.09 20.16 0.21 0.06 0.12 20.14 0.39 0.45 0.25
Health care 20.29** 0.10 20.24 0.23 20.43** 0.13 20.20 0.52 0.02 0.36
Permanent contract 0.71** 0.06 0.56** 0.14 0.72** 0.09 0.74** 0.27 0.90** 0.16
Part-time job 20.29** 0.08 20.13 0.14 20.30** 0.11 20.62 0.40 20.39 0.21
Length of service 0.02** 0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Constant 21.20** 0.13 20.79** 0.28 21.06** 0.19 21.52* 0.69 21.49** 0.41
Other determinants (see Table 2) y y y y y y y y y y
No. of cases 8057 1667 4694 385 1311
22 log likelihood 10303 2158 6011 474 1570
a Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance: *p,5%; **p,1%.217 M.S.M. van Smoorenburg, R.K.W. van der Velden / Economics of Education Review 19 (2000) 207–217
Table 6
Estimation results of a logit model of the probability of being
overeducated e.g. having a job with a lower required edu-









Width of initial education 0.99** 0.16
1–9 employees 0.16* 0.08
10–49 employees ref. ref.
50–499 employees 20.05 0.06
500 or more employees 20.33** 0.06
Agriculture and ﬁsheries 0.90** 0.16
Industry and mining ref. ref.
Construction 0.56** 0.13
Commerce, hotel and catering 0.37** 0.08
Transport and communication 0.23* 0.12
Commercial services 20.82** 0.08
Other services 20.24** 0.10
Health care 0.19* 0.09
Own ﬁeld ref. ref.
Related ﬁeld 0.94** 0.08
Another ﬁeld 2.32** 0.12
No particular ﬁeld 2.50** 0.09
Permanent contract 20.48** 0.06
Part-time work 0.39** 0.07
Length of service 0.01* 0.00
Constant 22.75** 0.15
Number of cases 11901
22 Log Likelihood 11341
a Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance: *p,5%; **p,1%.
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